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I feel certain that a great many of you here tonight—and, 
in fact, thoughtful people throughout the business and 
financial community—have been following the twists and 
turns of the debt problems of the world's less-developed 
countries (LDCs) extremely closely over the past year or 
so. The press and other media have provided extensive 
coverage. And there have been several excellent analyses 
of how the debt problems came about, both in general and 
for individual countries. Overall, I conclude that public 
understanding of the current situation is unusually good, 
given the enormous complexity of the issues at stake. 
What I think is less familiar, and worthy of more 
attention, is the discussion of what the world will be like 
after the current emergency is behind us. We all want to 
feel confident that, when something closer to normal 
circumstances is restored, we will have built a stronger, 
more resilient international financial system. No one 
wants a recurrence of debt disturbances like those of the 
past year. No one wants prolonged stagnation or in-
adequate growth in the developing countries of Latin 
America and elsewhere. That would worsen our own 
growth prospects and inhibit world trade. And prolonged 
stagnation—as distinct from the temporary setbacks 
associated with emergency adjustment programs—would 
raise a greater danger of serious social and political 
consequences in a number of the LDCs. 
Managing the Current Debt Problems 
Before discussing the postemergency period, I must make 
clear that I'm not complacent about the immediate task of 
completing the necessary debt restructurings and carrying 
through basic economic adjustments. We have to make 
sure we sustain the kind of concerted effort by all the 
principal participants which has yielded the tentative 
progress that's been made so far. The borrowing coun-
tries, the commercial banks, the governments in the 
industrial countries, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) have all had to make tough decisions and 
hard compromises. In particular, I think we should 
respect the painful measures that have already been taken 
and the sacrifices that have been endured by Mexico and 
some other countries. Under IMF guidance, these coun-
tries have, by any reasonable standard, made impressive 
efforts to adjust. But more hard work and political will 
must be marshalled, and more new financing will be 
required, before anyone can afford to relax. 
Obviously, this concerted effort must go forward and 
must succeed. But make no mistake about it. That can't 
happen unless the IMF can continue to play the pivotal 
role it has in binding together the different parts of this 
effort. And the Fund will be unable to play that role if it's 
starved of adequate financial resources and political 
support. 
Frankly, I find it baffling that there are elements in this 
country, and especially in our Congress, who can ignore 
the catastrophic effects that would result from not acting 
now to make resources available to the IMF quickly. 
Without the IMF at the pivot, the whole debt restructur-
ing effort would be undermined, and needed new credits 
would be blocked. Outright defaults could actually hap-
pen. In the longer run, the consequences could also be 
grave. Debtor countries could be forced into disorderly 
adjustments that would almost certainly include more 
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protectionist measures, credit controls, price distortions, 
and severe damage to local private sectors. It would injure 
the world trading system and seriously impair the pros-
pects for economic growth, not only in the debtor 
countries but here and everywhere else. 
The direct cost to the United States alone would be 
enormous. Until last year, our exports to LDCs that now 
have debt servicing problems had been averaging $50 bil-
lion a year—almost a quarter of our total exports. Already 
last year, exports to these countries fell by over $10 bil-
lion (more than 20 percent), costing us nearly 300 thou-
sand jobs and $1 billion in profits. How can it be rational 
for this country to risk giant price tags like these in the fu-
ture and oppose an increase in funding for the IMF (the 
quota increase)? 
I know that there are those who don't see it this way. 
Some look at the issue entirely in narrow financial terms 
and conclude that the IMF can squeak by without the 
quota increase for the time being. That view is wrong, and 
it misses the central point. In the absence of clear, 
unequivocal support for the institution by the U.S. 
government, including the Congress, the Fund will be 
permanently crippled. 
What's even more baffling is that, among those who 
would cripple the Fund, there are people who claim to be 
strong advocates of free markets. What they entirely fail 
to see is that the IMF, in its efforts to get countries to 
pursue market-oriented policies and to minimize the 
hodgepodge of distortions that undermine economic 
performance, is the best friend that market-oriented 
people have in the kind of world we live in. 
My strong sense is that the misguided opposition to the 
IMF quota legislation, and the mischievous amendments 
that undercut it, will not prevail. I believe that ultimately 
the Congress will support the IMF and act positively to 
meet the international responsibilities of the United 
States. It is in both our immediate and longer-term 
interest. 
Coping With Continuing Constraints 
Suppose that we all do what we need to do in the short 
term. Then, it's worth raising the question of what kind of 
economic prospects the LDCs—especially in Latin 
America, where the debt burden is greatest—can look 
forward to in a couple of years, when the immediate 
emergency is behind, but not forgotten. Can they return to 
rates of economic growth that are reasonably satisfactory 
and broadly meet their aspirations for achieving social 
and political progress? I don't want to put specific 
numbers on this, because growth potential differs from 
one country to the next. But I am talking about growth 
rates that would not be too far below the historical 
experience of most of the countries before the debt 
problems materialized. 
It seems to me that it is certainly not impossible to get 
that outcome. But we have to face reality. There are going 
to be continuing constraints that will limit the scope for 
expansionary policies for some time to come. We can 
identify ways of easing some of these constraints and 
softening their impact. And we can be heartened by more 
optimistic developments lately in the industrial econo-
mies, where the prospects for higher growth seem to be 
improving. But there still must be an extended period in 
which the heavily indebted LDC governments are going 
to have very little margin for error. 
The most obvious constraint will be with respect to 
external financing. Conventional commercial bank lend-
ing will be much harder to come by. In the first instance, 
that would limit countries' ability to import. And lower 
imports, particularly of capital goods, will hamper growth. 
The natural question is whether that shortfall can be 
replaced by greater official assistance from industrial 
country governments. In my view, that is not likely. While 
government officials have the will and resources to 
provide temporary support in a crisis, there really isn't 
much chance of legislatures going along with increases in 
long-term official funding in amounts large enough to 
significantly offset lower commercial bank lending. After 
all, it was partly because of the difficulty of obtaining 
official financing that borrowing from banks grew so 
much in the first place. 
Another question is whether the central banks of 
industrial countries—in particular, the Federal Re-
serve—should provide large-scale infusions of liquidity 
so as to ease credit availability for LDCs. Certainly, in a 
crisis, central banks have a traditional responsibility, as 
lenders of last resort, to insure stability. But any assist-
ance of that sort must be strictly temporary. Central 
banks simply cannot be viewed as a source of medium-
and long-term financing. 
So what's left? By the process of elimination, there are 
really only two alternatives: Either funds will have to find 
their way into LDCs through channels other than com-
mercial banks, or borrowing countries will have to run 
their economies in ways that make them less dependent 
on external financing. In fact, the LDCs will have to move 
3 on both fronts at the same time if they hope to be able to 
achieve the satisfactory growth rates we are talking about. 
Alternative Funding Channels 
Traditionally, direct investment has been an alternative to 
bank financing. In calmer times, greater direct investment 
inflows should be an effective source of capital. To be 
sure, we know that the internal political opposition to 
direct investment has been strident from time to time in 
the past and certainly could resurface as soon as the debt 
emergency starts to fade. Yet, it seems to me that this 
manifestation of economic nationalism must be chal-
lenged and overcome if the LDCs are going to be serious 
about economic development in a period when new bor-
rowing from commercial banks is constrained. 
Improving financial management offers another im-
portant way for borrowing countries to cope with the 
constraints they are going to face. This should especially 
include efforts to diversify the currency composition of a 
country's debt. By choice or by necessity, too much of the 
debt of many LDCs was in dollars. That left them 
vulnerable to a period of high dollar exchange rates and 
high dollar interest rates. We calculate that if from 1979 
to 1982 developing countries had borrowed currencies in 
a diversified way—that is, in proportion to their import 
shares—the LDCs as a group would today be over $30 
billion better off. I am not saying that kind of benefit can 
be repeated in any particular time period in the future. But 
the clear lesson is that a more balanced and skillfully 
drawn portfolio of debt is important. Of course, that 
requires not only a willingness of borrowers to diversify, 
but equally a willingness of market participants to modify 
their operations and of the authorities in other industrial 
countries to allow it. 
In addition, both borrowers and lenders have an 
interest in taking some potentially valuable financial 
instruments off the drawing board and getting them to 
market. To take one example, perhaps commercial banks 
could shift at the margin toward originating loans and then 
selling them off into a secondary market, where price 
fluctuations could give useful, early disciplinary signals to 
borrowers. Or, to take another example, I can visualize 
variable maturity obligations that offer a constant debt 
service flow in the face of any unexpected jump in interest 
rates, a kind of built-in rescheduling. There may also be a 
place in the market for securities with equitylike features, 
on which some part of the total yield to the investor could 
be calibrated, for instance, to the borrowing country's real 
gross national product or export earnings growth or some 
similar measure of economic performance. 
Finally, there are a number of tools and techniques 
that are used by corporate borrowers here but are not yet 
being used by borrowers in developing countries. Just to 
give two illustrations, these instruments range from 
futures contracts to hedge against commodity fluctua-
tions to interest rate swaps that can add another way of 
gaining fixed rate funding. In a period of restricted access 
to credit, it is worthwhile developing the expertise and 
sophistication to take advantage of the array of novel 
financing tools that are now available. 
Economic Policy Reforms 
Innovations like those in the private capital markets would 
be helpful in ameliorating the financing problem. But I 
wouldn't want to overstate the role that these mechanisms 
can play. It will not eliminate the need for major changes 
and reforms in general economic policies so that depen-
dence on external financing is lastingly reduced. 
The way I see it there are three broad areas where 
policy, reform in borrowing countries is called for to 
reduce dependence on external financing and promote 
domestic savings. (After all, on average, gross domestic 
savings finance 90 percent of LDC investment.) 
The first is in the balance of payments area. It seems to 
me that heavily indebted developing countries have to be 
resolute in keeping their exports competitive in world 
markets. First and foremost, this means following real-
istic exchange rate policies and not letting the domestic 
currency get out of line. It also means realistic interest 
rates to deter damaging flight of domestic capital. 
The second broad area is reform of government 
budgeting. To begin with, though it's getting harder for an 
American to preach to others on the subject, excessively 
large structural deficits have to be reduced. In addition, 
LDC governments must have tighter oversight of spend-
ing agencies, closer financial monitoring of projects, 
better and more timely budget numbers, and improved 
regulatory capabilities over their own financial institu-
tions. 
The third broad area is reform of the domestic price 
system. Every subsidy, every credit allocation scheme, 
every price distortion has to be tested against the standard 
of what it costs, both in budgetary terms and in terms of 
economic efficiency. These are long-standing problems 
that existed well before the debt crisis. And fixing any of 
them inevitably pits a government against powerful 
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vested interests at home. But in the aftermath of the debt 
problem, there may be no alternative to meeting the task 
head-on, because of the huge toll distortions take in 
limiting productivity and growth. 
Help From the Rest of the World 
The governments in the industrial countries and the IMF 
both have to support LDC efforts to bring about market-
oriented reforms and better financial management. 
The industrial countries obviously have a major role to 
play in sustaining growth, in lowering global interest rates 
by reducing their own government deficits, and in keeping 
markets open for LDC goods. At the same time they have 
to open up their financial markets further so that the LDCs 
can diversify their sources of credit more effectively. 
They must help create a healthy world environment with-
in which the LDC efforts can pay off. 
As for the IMF, its role in managing crises is well-
recognized and indispensable. But treatment and cure are 
not enough; it must work harder and more effectively at 
prevention. What I see as close to being essential is that 
its surveillance role under more normal circumstances be 
enhanced. This has two dimensions. 
First, the IMF should be assisting countries in im-
proving their financial management. It can help them 
monitor their debts. It can work with countries to develop 
financial strategies covering the currency and maturity 
mix of borrowing as well as the degree of reliance on bank 
debt, bond finance, direct investment, and so on. 
Second, appropriate IMF surveillance should extend 
well beyond matters of finance. The Fund is not just a 
lender. It is a force for promoting sensible policies. I 
believe it should put its weight behind governments which 
are committed to a transition toward more efficient 
domestic price, interest rate, and exchange rate policies. 
And it must reject the argument that the IMF should 
focus only on a balance of payments target, regardless of 
how it's achieved. 
These broader efforts by the Fund should be an 
integral part of its regular consultations with all members. 
We don't want to go back to a situation where the IMF 
becomes deeply involved only after serious payments 
disruptions have occurred. That's too late. 
Instead, a more continuous relationship would have 
some important advantages. It would improve the Fund's 
detailed knowledge of the constraints that regularly 
confront policymakers in each individual country. And it 
would provide a type of involvement by the Fund that 
might head off some of the resentment and occasional 
hostility that can occur when the IMF is seen as an 
outsider always prescribing austerity at a time of trouble. 
To encourage movement in this general direction, I 
would go even one step further. It would be worthwhile 
considering whether access to funding could be made 
more readily available by the IMF to countries that 
voluntarily participate in these financial and economic 
policy reviews, should they have a balance of payments 
need later on. 
Summary 
In summary, we must plan for a world of tighter financial 
constraints and less margin for error. The approach I am 
recommending boils down to a combination of stronger 
market institutions and better market instruments de-
veloping alongside better economic policies and stronger 
financial controls. In my approach, there is no quick fix. 
There is no single scheme or gimmick that will put things 
right and allow everybody to go back to business as usual. 
To the contrary, I feel that those debt reshuffling schemes 
that you hear about, which look to industrial country 
governments to pick up existing exposure from the 
banking system, are fanciful. They would be unjustifiably 
costly to the taxpayers. And in fact, they would give just 
the wrong signals, convincing people at home that a 
government bailout will always be there and whipping up 
pressures abroad in developing countries to ask for 
bailouts. 
What I am recommending is rooted instead in pragma-
tism. It basically seeks to build a more resilient system on 
the best features of what we have now. 
And what we have now pivots on the IMF. That is the 
institution which in practical terms binds the system 
together and which must play a more comprehensive role 
in the future. Therefore, the first step toward that kind of 
system is for the Congress to act quickly and positively on 
the IMF quota legislation and put to rest doubts about the 
commitment of the United States to a commonsense, 
multilateral approach to dealing with the world's financial 
problems. 
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